Performance Measurement and Performance Information in New Democracies by Nõmm, K. (Külli) & Randma-Liiv, T. (Tiina)
Public Management Review 2012 
 
1 
 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND 
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION IN NEW 
DEMOCRACIES: A STUDY OF THE 
ESTONIAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
 
Külli Nõmm and Tiina Randma-Liiv 
Tallinn University of Technology 
 
Abstract 
This article explores the introduction of performance measurement 
tools in new democracies by presenting a qualitative study based 
on Estonian governmental documents and performance audits. A 
set of specific factors help to explain difficulties in introducing 
performance measurement tools in immature policy environments: 
instability, poor strategic planning and policy analysis, an 
implementation gap, uncritical and uninformed transfer of Western 
performance management initiatives. Although the authors 
recognize the limits of generalizations based on the Estonian 
example, the presence of such ‘transitional’ factors is likely to 
make the development of performance measurement in new 
democracies even more complicated than in the West. 
 
Key words 
Performance measurement, performance information, new 
democracies, Estonia, Central and Eastern Europe 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1980s, the public sector worldwide has been 
under constant pressure to improve its performance in pursuit of 
more efficiency and effectiveness, and in order to revive the 
citizens’ trust in public institutions. Although performance 
measurement is as old as public administration itself and played a 
central role in many other models (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004: 
90), no other public sector reform movement has promoted the use 
of performance information on a scale comparable to that 
advocated by ‘New Public Management’(NPM) reforms (Van 
Dooren 2008). Using private sector management instruments in 
the public sector as well as the fostering of ‘performance culture’ 
or ‘performance orientedness’ has led to an increase in the use of 
various performance management tools (Van Dooren et al. 2010). 
In the literature, the terms ‘performance management’ and 
‘performance measurement’ are used interchangeably with 
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confusing definitions. This article is based on the definition of 
performance management as a type of management in which 
information in relation to performance is used for decision-making 
(Van Dooren et al. 2010, p. 30), whereas performance information 
is generated and utilized through performance measurement 
routines (Radnor 2008, 95). We focus on both the supply and the 
demand sides of performance measurement (Askim 2007, Askim 
2009) by studying why and how government makes performance 
information available and how this information is actually used in 
the decision-making. 
A number of studies (e.g. Goetz 2001; Verheijen 2003; 
Dunn et al. 2006; World Bank 2006; Bouckaert et al. 2008; 
SIGMA 2009; Zubek and Goetz 2010; Meyer-Sahling and 
Yesilkagit 2011; Randma-Liiv et al. 2011) have already 
considered various aspects of public management reforms in 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Yet, the 
performance management – and more particularly, performance 
measurement – component of these reform attempts has not 
received sufficient academic attention so far. The few studies (e.g. 
Schick 1998; Condrey et al. 2001; Randma-Liiv 2005; World 
Bank 2006; Tonnisson and Wilson 2007; Verheijen and 
Dobrolyubova 2007; Nakrošis 2008; Nemec et al. 2008; Raudla 
2011) that focus on the introduction of particular performance 
based management tools are rather descriptive and have ended up 
with contradictory conclusions. Furthermore, not much attention 
has been paid to the actual implementation or use of performance 
information. The article at hand proposes to make up for that 
deficit. 
The aim of this article is not only to describe the 
introduction of various performance measurement tools in a post-
communist country but also to explain how the transitional context 
influences the adoption of performance measurement instruments 
and the use of performance information in new democracies. 
Through exploring the introduction of performance management 
tools in Estonia, it will be demonstrated that although problems 
common in performance measurement in Western countries are 
also present in the Estonian context, they are compounded by 
specific contextual factors encountered in post-communist 
administrations: instability, poor strategic planning and policy 
analysis, the implementation gap and foreign influence. 
The study is based on qualitative exploratory research 
leading to the elaboration of explanatory variables that contribute 
to further understanding of performance measurement in new 
democracies. The theoretical foundation is based on a synthesis of 
existing literature of performance measurement and of post-
communist transition. Taking into account very recent trends in 
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the research of performance management (see Andrews et al.2006; 
Askim 2009; Van Dooren et al. 2010, for example), the study 
focuses on the purposes of performance measurement, the choice 
of performance indicators, and the practice of performance 
information use. 
Empirical evidence is drawn from the analysis of various 
governmental documents, the findings of the Riigikontroll 
(National Audit Office of Estonia, the NAO) of Estonia and from 
personal observations. For more than a decade, the authors of the 
study have closely followed performance measurement reforms 
from an academic as well as a practical perspective (the latter 
through their work for the NAO (as performance audit manager 
and expert, respectively). The NAO started to carry out 
performance audits in accordance with international auditing 
standards in the late 1990s. This study is based on the analysis of 
40 performance audits. The World Bank (2005) classification of 
performance management tools is used for the general framework. 
The study has a potential for policy learning. Some of our 
findings may apply to other CEE countries because of the 
similarity of post-communist contexts. Although Estonia has been 
claimed to be “one of the CEE countries closest to NPM models” 
(Drechsler 2004: 391), most post-communist countries have also 
introduced performance management tools during the last two 
decades (Bouckaert et al. 2008). Yet, the generalization of 
Estonian experience should be done with caution because of 
different historical, political and cultural environments within 
CEE. It could, however,  be argued that the presence of proposed 
‘transitional’ factors is likely to make the development of 
performance measurement in new democracies even more 
complicated than in the West. 
 
PERFORMANCE: A CONTROVERSIAL CONCEPT 
Alongside the rise of NPM reforms, performance measurement has 
become more extensive, intensive and external during the last few 
decades (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). However, public 
administration scholars tend to approach performance 
measurement in the public sector as a conceptual problem (Van de 
Walle 2009). Efforts to measure government ineluctably meet with 
the essential problem of defining public sector aims (Van de Walle 
2009). Ironically, performance management does not always lead 
to better performance and may even result in pervasive effects (see 
Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Andrews et al. 2006; Andersen 2008 
for example), as performance measurement systems struggle to 
find a gaming-proof design (Bevan and Hood 2006; Radnor 2008), 
and there is little evidence on the actual use of performance 
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information (Pollitt 2006). 
To explain this conceptual controversy, recent scientific 
literature often goes back to the roots of the issue by analyzing the 
aims of performance measurement in the public sector and the 
actual use of the information, also called ‘demand side’ of the 
performance management (Askim 2007). This section provides a 
brief overview of the state-of-the-art research on performance 
measurement and performance information use by asking the 
questions ‘why?’, ‘how?’ and ‘what for?’ The following analysis 
of the Estonian experience in introducing performance 
management tools is based on this framework. 
Why measure performance? 
Performance measurement has an internal and an external 
function, which are termed, respectively, the managerial and the 
democratic aspect of performance information, depending on who 
is regarded as the ‘end user’ of that information (Pollitt 2006). In 
many cases, however, the line between the two is vague. Most 
performance measurement literature deals with the managerial 
aspects of performance information – with the aim to inform 
specific decisions, to create benchmarks, to determine budget 
allocations, to improve communication and feedback, to serve as 
input for motivation systems, career development and the 
promotion of individuals. Management decisions are justified in 
the context of performance because legal or internal standards are 
not sufficient to guide public sector operations (Behn 2003). 
The external use of performance information is aimed at 
informing the public (the legislature, other politicians, 
constituencies, taxpayers and service users) about the performance 
of public institutions. Publication of performance information is 
expected to help achieve accountability and control, and to 
enhance democratic legitimacy and transparency in the public 
sector (Talbot 2007). In addition, performance measurement 
possesses an important symbolic function because of the 
importance of performance management as a public relations asset 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004: 6). For the public and its 
representatives, performance measurement symbolizes the fact that 
public managers care about the performance of their staff, which 
contributes to improving the image and buttressing the legitimacy 
of the public sector. 
The concept of performance measurement looks intuitively 
so appealing to policy makers that it seems almost ridiculous to 
question. However, performance measurement in the public sector 
has received severe academic critique and raised a number of 
practical issues (e.g. Halachmi 1993; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; 
Bevan and Hood 2006; Talbot 2007; Andersen 2008; Radnor 
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2008; Van Dooren 2008; Van de Walle 2009). These analyses are 
useful in understanding the problems that result from inaccurate 
assumptions and implementation difficulties (e.g. over-
quantification, over-simplification, emphasizing short-term goals 
over broader ones, bureaucracy reinforcement and high 
transaction costs, problems of attribution and causality, 
organizational gaming, etc.). Contrary to the belief that 
performance measurement can help to make better and more 
rational decisions, the aforementioned problems may eventually 
lead to a drop in the quality of the public service concerned or 
even to a decrease in public sector efficiency in general. 
How is performance measured?  
The development of performance indicators is the foundation of 
any performance measurement system. Several authors (e.g. 
Bevan and Hood 2006; Talbot 2007) have drawn attention to the 
problem of the great diversity and near intangibility of objectives 
and performance criteria in the public sector – the goals are often 
vague, difficult to follow and hard to evaluate quantitatively. Yet, 
performance measurement favors quantitative indicators that are 
easily measured and simple to check (Talbot 2007; Van Dooren 
2008). Numerical targets have an air of objectivity and are thus 
more appealing to decision-makers than qualitative assessments.  
The choice of performance indicators is shaped by social 
and political mechanisms. These include domestic political and 
institutional forces, and international exchange and diffusion of 
experience (Van Stolk and Wegrich 2008). Setting performance 
goals and indicators is a process that is intimately linked to 
specifying and implementing strategic political choices. The 
choice of indicators is thus dependent on political leadership and 
overall (strategic) planning considerations. Since strategy planning 
is also strategy formation (Mintzberg 1994: 24–25), planners exert 
a significant impact on how those goals and indicators are 
implemented. However, it is not only domestic actors and the 
corresponding political environment but also international 
institutions and trends that determine how and what is measured 
(Van Stolk and Wegrich 2008). 
Because of the above-mentioned difficulties and dilemmas, 
performance information may sometimes prove incomprehensive 
or unobjective, shown to favor selective measurement, 
presentation and interpretation, thus serving the interests of the 
actors involved (Bevan and Hood 2006). 
How is performance information used? 
If we want to study the successes and failures of performance 
movements, we have to study the use of performance information 
(Van Dooren 2008: 22). Recent public sector reforms have 
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contributed to collecting enormous amounts of performance 
information (Behn 2003; Pollitt 2006). The underlying assumption 
to the use of performance information for internal, management 
purposes is that performance information can be integrated into the 
decision-making process, leading to better-quality decisions and, 
ultimately, improved performance. However, existing findings 
suggest that the efforts invested in measuring performance 
considerably outstrip the eagerness shown in using the information 
gathered (e.g. Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Lægreid et al. 2006). 
Evidence of active and systematic external use of 
performance information for democratic purposes is even more 
limited. Researchers tend to be skeptical about the use of 
performance information by politicians (Lægreid et al. 2006; 
Raudla 2011), although some (e.g. Askim 2007) have found 
positive evidence as well. It is rather rare that even the ministries 
of finance use performance information for action. In OECD 
countries only 4% of ministries of finance use performance 
measures to eliminate programs, 10% to cut expenditure and 11% 
to determine pay (OECD 2007). 
Evaluating the impact of management reforms has not been 
a priority of politicians, because there is more popularity to be 
won by announcing new initiatives than by evaluating previous 
ones. No performance movement can depoliticize policy-making 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Pollitt 2006). Politicians do not make 
decisions on considerations of economy, efficiency or 
effectiveness alone – to a great extent, they rely on their values 
and political views.  
Evidence about citizens’ interest in performance 
measurement is even more difficult to pin down. Some authors are 
positively disposed towards the concept of citizen-driven 
government performance (Holzer and Yang 2004), while others 
argue that there is no direct evidence of reforms that have been 
undertaken as a response to public opinion and point out that the 
vast majority of citizens are unlikely to benefit from detailed 
performance information (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Pollitt 
2006). If not used, performance information, no matter how valid 
and detailed, cannot fulfill its function of fostering goal setting, 
accountability, public sector transparency and legitimacy. 
 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN ESTONIA 
Estonia regained its independence in 1991 after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, its democratization and 
institution building process started at the beginning of the 1990s, 
when the NPM movement in the West was at its peak. The NPM 
ideology sat well with countries that were abolishing their one-
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sector economies and carrying out large-scale privatizations. The 
development of the Estonian public administration has been 
influenced by the consecutive neo-liberal governments and by the 
values and ideas of NPM, as NPM ideas have prevailed in various 
public administration reform concepts and strategies originating in 
the second half of the 1990s (see e.g. Drechsler 2004; Tõnnisson 
and Randma-Liiv 2008). Anti-statist views within Estonian 
society, partly influenced by the Soviet legacy (Drechsler 2004), 
and the elite’s belief in the ‘lean’ state have paved the way to the 
development of a decentralized administrative system. 
According to the Constitution (1992), the executive power 
in Estonia rests with the government, which exercises that power 
directly through ministries and government agencies. Executive 
government institutions include the ministries, the State 
Chancellery and county governments, as well as executive 
agencies and inspectorates with the authority to exercise executive 
power. A ministry is a superior body ranking above executive 
agencies, inspectorates, and other state agencies. Government 
agencies are accountable to the respective minister, who directs 
and coordinates their activities. Executive government institutions 
covered by the civil service employ around 20,000 employees 
altogether, whereas the workforce of the eleven Estonian 
ministries counted 2,448 employees in 2009. A typical ministry 
employs a staff of fewer than 200. Although ministries are small, 
they represent strong administrative actors that have considerable 
leverage over the issues belonging to their areas of governance 
(Sarapuu 2011). In addition, the EU accession process further 
cemented a decentralized setup and functioning of the Estonian 
public administration (see more in Sarapuu 2011). A high level of 
decentralization has been linked to a great interest in performance 
management tools as means of steering autonomous organizations. 
The following analysis focuses on the development and 
implementation of performance measurement practices in Estonian 
central government since 1991. The Estonian government has 
experimented with most of the internationally known performance 
management tools (see Table 1). Some tools have already been 
abandoned by 2011, while others have been integrated into a set of 
central and regularly employed measures. The application of 
performance management tools has involved a few horizontal and 
even compulsory initiatives (e.g. the introduction of detailed 
action plans with performance targets, pay-for-performance). 
However, as Estonian public administration is decentralized to a 
large degree, it is difficult to make generalized assessments about 
the application of other performance management initiatives. 
Motives behind such exercises are highly dependent on individual 
and organizational factors, and tend to be haphazard rather than 
systematic. On the organizational level, the extent and way of 
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using performance information depends on the internal regulations 
of the organization, and the corresponding practices are highly 
diverse. 
Table 1. Overview of the application of key performance 
management tools in Estonia 
Performance 
management tool 
(World Bank 2005) 
Examples of application in Estonia 
Annual performance 
reports of ministries 
Ministries are required to prepare 
detailed action plans with annual and 
four-year performance targets during 
the budgeting process, and to report on 
progress towards targets in their annual 
reports. 
Performance 
measurement 
methodology 
There is no integrated central 
performance measurement 
methodology; the Ministry of Finance 
only provides standard document 
forms with brief guidelines. 
Performance 
budgeting 
methodology 
Budgeting documents contain 
performance information. 
Expenditures are loosely and/or 
occasionally linked to output or 
outcome targets. In some cases, 
performance contracts for public 
funding are entered into (e.g. public 
universities are financed according to 
the number of graduates). 
Macroeconomic 
indicators 
These provide information about and 
projections for a series of key 
indicators: GDP, budget deficit, 
inflation, unemployment, exports, 
productivity, foreign direct investment, 
etc. 
Societal indicators Government performance measures 
include a wide range of targets 
connected to societal indicators such as 
poverty level, life expectancy, gender 
equality, societal integration, etc. 
International 
assessments 
Some international evaluations and 
rankings are integrated into domestic 
targets and reports: e.g. World Values 
Survey; Freedom House measures for 
Freedom in the World and Freedom of 
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the Press; Doing Business rankings; 
Economic freedom indicators; 
Transparency International’s 
corruption perceptions index. 
Service quality 
measures 
In most cases, the indicator measured 
is the accessibility of public services 
(length of waiting lists, percentage of 
population covered by the service, 
speed of the service). 
Outcome/output 
measures 
Performance targets are mostly output 
measures, usually expressed in units of 
work or product or completed projects. 
Several ministries have also attempted 
to measure outcomes (e.g. employment 
rate among young people who have 
completed a vocational education, 
delinquency rate, repeat imprisonment 
rate, fatality rate in traffic accidents, 
fatality rate in fire accidents, etc.). 
Client surveys Client surveys are carried out on the 
initiative of individual organizations; 
e.g. the Estonian Health Insurance 
Fund conducts annual client surveys 
among its insured, employees and 
contractors. A few other agencies, such 
as the Estonian Tax and Customs 
Board, have introduced client 
satisfaction indicators into their 
performance targets. In most cases, 
client surveys are not conducted on a 
regular basis, or their results are 
intended for internal use only. 
Public opinion polls Results of public opinion polls are 
included in the detailed strategic goals 
of the ministries (e.g. trustworthiness, 
commitment and competence of civil 
servants; trust in the government 
institutions). 
Third party 
validation 
Quality awards for public sector 
institutions and public services, 
international assessment rankings (see 
above). 
Individual 
performance 
A central pay-for-performance 
initiative was launched in 2001 that 
included setting individual 
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contracts/targets performance targets. Organizational 
practices differ; individual 
performance contracts have been 
applied only in some rather rare cases. 
Audit reports External performance audits by the 
NAO, occasional performance audits 
by the ministries’ internal audit 
departments. 
Program evaluations Program evaluations are carried out 
mostly for programs supported by EU 
funds. Evaluations for domestically 
funded programs are performed on a 
random basis. 
 
Why is performance measured? 
Performance measurement in the Estonian central government is 
considered to help make better decisions, to lead to more 
economic, efficient and effective public administration, to result in 
improving the quality of public service provision, to make the 
public sector more transparent and to enhance its legitimacy 
(Rahandusministeerium 2008). 
Estonian public administration has experienced different 
performance management tools (see overview in Table 1), but 
there are two remarkable cases in which performance initiatives 
were implemented throughout the central government – the 
introduction of pay-for-performance and the strategic planning 
reform. In 2001, the Ministry of Finance introduced a central pay-
for-performance initiative. It was believed to help achieve better 
results at no extra cost, to increase public sector transparency and 
attractiveness, to improve public sector planning and to cut the red 
tape. Despite the absence of evidence of an improved 
performance, most of the funds set aside for pay-for-performance 
were paid out in 2002 – bonuses were even allocated for 
unfulfilled tasks or released before evaluation reports for the 
corresponding projects were drawn up. For example, the Ministry 
of Finance allocated pay-for-performance to 100% of its 
employees, and performance bonuses were paid to 80–90% of 
civil servants in the Ministry of Defense and in the Ministry of 
Highways and Communications (Riigikontroll 2002; Randma-Liiv 
2005). The initiative required a considerable amount of additional 
paperwork from all government units. After this experiment, the 
centrally regulated pay-for-performance scheme was discontinued 
a few years later as it did not achieve its intended aims. 
In 2005, the Estonian government reached an agreement 
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regarding the overhaul of its strategic planning system. The new 
system was founded on performance measurement and thus 
requires the setting of targets. Before 2005, planning decisions 
were made pursuant to a series of uncoordinated strategies, 
announced without legal or financial commitment and often 
inconsistent in their content. However, many analytical reports, 
international as well as domestic, still refer to deficiencies in 
strategic planning in Estonia (e.g. World Bank 2006; Riigikontroll 
2008b; OECD 2011). Partly in response to these, the Ministry of 
Finance initiated a project to reform the strategic planning system 
in 2010. The main aim is to restructure the strategic planning, 
budgeting and reporting system. The current division of planning 
responsibilities, in which each ministry is accountable for its 
sphere of government, is expected to be replaced by a division 
into integrated performance areas, i.e. a system consisting of 
comprehensive fields of activities and responsibilities, each of 
which is likely to include input from several ministries, 
resembling a program budgeting model. Amongst other aims, this 
initiative is intended to improve performance measurement and 
reporting in central government (PRAXIS 2010). At the time that 
the current study was conducted, the design of the new system 
was still in process. 
There is wide recognition in Estonia’s public institutions of 
the need to use performance information for public sector 
legitimization purposes, and for improving the overall image of 
the public sector. In 2010, only slightly more than half (56%) of 
poll respondents thought public servants were competent, and only 
45% regarded government officials as trustworthy. In 2005, the 
results were correspondingly 67% and 60% 
(Rahandusministeerium). In spite of public institutions’ belief in 
performance measurement as a means of improving the image of 
the public sector, there is no evidence to suggest that this has 
exerted a positive impact on public perceptions of the state. On the 
contrary, large-scale failures of performance management 
initiatives might result in a negative impact on public sector 
legitimacy. For example, in 2005, the so-called ‘performance 
target scandal’ sparked a government crisis, causing the Minister 
of Justice to step down, and later the entire Cabinet to resign. The 
case concerned a set of performance targets that the Ministry of 
Justice had set to the police, including amongst other things a 
target for misdemeanor convictions. This caused a public outcry, 
being condemned as an instance of Soviet-style ‘planned 
economy’ and ‘repression’ (Riigikogu 2005). The scandal resulted 
in the public discourse on performance targeting being cast in a 
negative light for some time. 
From the perspective of external aims of performance 
measurement, international insistence on the need for performance 
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measurement has played a crucial role in Estonia. Having a good 
international image is essential for a new democracy to win 
recognition as a trustworthy partner to other members of the 
international community. When a government realizes this, it 
accords considerable weight to foreign opinions. In the Estonian 
case, references to the need to comply with the ‘soft’ 
recommendations of international organizations (such as the 
OECD recommendations to reform higher education financing, for 
example) are included in the relevant performance targets and in 
explanatory memoranda laid before the Parliament together with 
new legislative proposals. In addition, various European Union 
targets are incorporated into the domestic targets. There are even 
cases where the Estonian government has set itself higher targets, 
or has resolved to achieve a goal in a shorter timeframe than that 
established in European policy documents. For example, the 
Estonian government has adopted an ambitious 13.5% as the 2013 
target rate of participation in life-long learning, while the 
corresponding European target, set in the Lisbon strategy, is 
12.5%. No explanations have been given for setting these higher 
targets (Riigikontroll 2010). 
How is performance measured? The development of a public 
sector performance measurement system requires a presence of 
good analytical skills. However, the Estonian NAO found in 10 
out of 14 performance audit reports published in 2009 that 
performance indicators and targets were not based on a sufficient 
analytical foundation (by that confirming previously found 
concerns over the quality of performance data, see Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004: 115). More often than not, the methodology for 
measuring the targets or impact indicators had not been agreed 
upon before the start of the policy planning process (see PRAXIS 
2007). The previously mentioned pay-for-performance initiative 
was also criticized because of the poor analytical basis (Randma-
Liiv 2005). 
Although Estonia is sometimes recognized as one of the 
forerunners in the development of e-governance (e.g. World Bank 
2006, OECD 2011), and its electronic registers and information 
systems provide the government with a plethora of information, 
these possibilities are often underused for performance 
measurement purposes. In the ministries responsible for setting 
and measuring performance targets, analytical departments are 
understaffed or in some cases missing altogether (see also 
Drechsler 2004 on Estonian administrative capacity). No central 
training or methodological support in performance measurement 
techniques is provided. Thus, it can happen that performance 
indicators are calculated incorrectly or do not adequately reflect 
the performance aspect they purport to measure. For example, to 
calculate the drop-out rate of the country’s vocational schools, the 
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Ministry of Education and Research applied a formula that 
resulted in rates which for some groups exceeded 100% 
(Riigikontroll 2009). Therefore, official statistics of drop-out 
levels in vocational schools, which represent an important input 
for policy decisions, remained misleading for years. 
The political and administrative culture in Estonia strongly 
supports quantifiable targets, which is also reflected in the 
manifestos of political parties that include increasingly detailed 
targets. For example, the leading Reform Party’s run-up campaign 
to the 2007 general parliamentary elections was constructed 
around the ambitious slogan ‘We will take Estonia into the top 
five wealthiest European countries in 15 years’. Each year, 
strategic documents contain more and more targets that are 
quantitative. For example, a strategic plan of the Ministry of 
Finance (which is the most influential promoter of quantification 
of targets throughout the central government) for the years 2006–
2009 included 54% quantitative indicators while the strategic plan 
for the years 2011–2014 has 83% quantitative indicators. 
However, targets and reporting standards change, the time-
series of various indicators remain short, and the accuracy of 
performance information provided by the public institutions is not 
evaluated systematically. Without the appropriate analytical, 
technical and strategic capacity, performance measurement risks 
to succumb to the pitfalls of over-simplification, neglect of broad 
perspective, bureaucracy reinforcement and gaming (see Bevan 
and Hood 2006; Talbot 2007; Andersen 2008; Radnor 2008; Van 
de Walle 2009). Numerous streamlining efforts as a rule aim to 
perfect the technical procedures of the Estonian system rather than 
take up the politically risky task of incorporating qualitative goals 
into strategic action plans. The impact of excessive quantification 
of targets on democratic values and the cost of implementing the 
system has not been properly considered. 
How is performance information used? 
The development of a performance measurement system is not 
merely a managerial task – it involves considerable strategic and 
political considerations. Much depends on whether and how 
individual policy makers decide to employ the information 
provided. In Estonia, performance targets are integrated into the 
annual action plans of the ministries. The targets and information 
about their achievement (or non-achievement) are expected to 
constitute an input to the budgeting process. However, the role of 
performance information in the actual budget negotiations is 
insignificant as budgetary decisions largely depend on political 
negotiations (Riigikontroll 2008b). 
Western experience with performance targeting shows that 
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because of the perceived need to avoid possibly negative 
consequences resulting from not meeting a target, a host of 
problems related to gaming with the performance information 
appear (e.g. Bevan and Hood 2006; Radnor 2008). In Estonia, with 
some rare exceptions, performance measurement tends to be 
indirectly related to specific rewards or punishments. A public 
manager will not lose his or her job because of not meeting a 
performance target – at best, such failure may be a secondary 
reason or simply a pretext. Even in cases where, under the terms of 
a performance contract, future funding could be reduced because a 
target established in a previous contract was not met – such is 
often the case in government-funded provision of higher education 
– the government prefers not to exercise this option (Riigikontroll 
2008a). In the case of the central pay-for-performance initiative, 
most bonus payments were made without any reference to an 
achievement that they supposedly remunerated (Randma-Liiv 
2005). 
If meeting or not meeting a performance target does not 
entail any tangible consequences, the purpose of performance 
measurement is understandably called into question. Nevertheless, 
it would be an ill recommendation to suggest that performance 
targets should be rigidly linked to specific rewards or 
punishments, because the failure of policy implementation all too 
often reflects a failure of goal setting. Because of poor ex ante 
policy analysis, Estonian policy targets have often been found 
unrealistic, or their achievement has been influenced by actions of 
political parties rather than public sector institutions (Riigikontroll 
2008a, 2009, 2010). In such cases, performance targets run the risk 
of creating a lock-in effect – rewards and punishments could lead 
to undesirable consequences instead of helping to achieve the 
actual policy goal. 
The interest of Estonian legislators and politicians in 
performance information is hectic, mostly driven by short-term 
political considerations. A few previous studies show that although 
politicians like to report the use of performance information (see 
Tonnisson and Wilson 2007 on benchmarking), they tend to 
overestimate the actual use of performance information (Nemec et 
al. 2011), and in practice, legislators make only limited use of the 
formal documents containing performance information (Raudla 
2011). 
The government prefers to release positive information 
only (Riigikontroll 2011), while the purpose of the opposition is to 
emphasizes failures, and various media editions hunt for headlines. 
For example, every performance audit report published by the 
NAO is discussed in the Select Committee for State Budget 
Control. The personal experience of the author of this article 
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confirms that members of the committee only manage to read the 
summary of the report, and very rarely the report itself. Opposition 
politicians are usually much more active in discussions of NAO 
reports than representatives of the ruling coalition. And last but not 
least, drawing up a national budget is a political process informed 
by considerations extending beyond mere efficiency and 
effectiveness (Raudla 2011). For this very reason, it is difficult to 
integrate performance measurement into the budgeting process. 
There are precious few examples of performance 
information targeted to citizen use by the government. For 
example, information about waiting lists in hospitals is provided 
publicly. However, there is no systematic evidence about the 
extent of use of this kind of information. The performance 
information that is most widely used by the citizens ─ school 
rankings ─ is compiled by journalists and published in the 
newspapers, instead of being publicly provided by the 
government. Similarly to Western experience, evidence about the 
use that legislators, politicians and citizens make of performance 
information remains limited in Estonia. 
The introduction of performance management tools 
possesses a strong symbolic value – it allows a government to 
pose as progressive to its constituents. However, the Estonian case 
study demonstrates that the implementation gap between declared 
aims of performance measurement and its actual practice may not 
only reduce the practical effects of such tools but also have a 
negative impact on the legitimacy of government institutions. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The findings of the exploratory study of Estonia suggest 
three principal conclusions. Firstly, they provide support to critical 
conclusions reached by previous studies of performance 
measurement in Western countries. Secondly, the study reported 
here allows to outline a set of specific factors that help to explain 
the problems of performance measurement in immature policy 
environments (instability, poor strategic planning and policy 
analysis, the implementation gap and foreign influence). Thirdly, it 
will be demonstrated that such contextual factors are very 
influential in other CEE countries which, in turn, allows it to 
generalize some of the findings to other post-communist countries. 
 
Instability 
Very few measurement systems are free from design flaws and do 
not need any adjustment or fine-tuning to function properly. The 
policy evaluation process itself can lead to questioning the validity 
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of policy goals and performance indicators. Yet, any performance 
measurement system presumes a certain stability of performance 
targets to make it possible for the system to perform its evaluative 
and steering functions. These, in turn, presuppose valid and fixed 
indicators if they are to result in a reliable and accurate assessment 
of performance. Any performance measurement system requires a 
stable baseline for comparison (Behn 2003: 598–599) – otherwise, 
no improvement or deterioration over time can be registered. 
In Estonia, fourteen different cabinets have held office 
during the period of 1991–2011. The average lifespan of a cabinet 
has been 1.38 years (Conrad and Golder 2010). Turbulent 
environment represents a serious challenge for performance 
measurement systems in terms of discharging their accountability 
and control functions that are highly dependent on valid indicators. 
As performance indicators are dependent on the policy-making 
process in a democratic society, one might expect that with 
changes in the government, performance targets will change as 
well. In Estonia, however, a change of cabinet has not resulted in 
instant and radical overhauls of performance targets because 
detailed action plans are not perceived to have a high political 
significance. Public reporting by politicians is based more on party 
programs than government plans. 
However, instability is not limited to political changes. The 
staff leaving rate in the Estonian public service has been between 
10–15% over the last five years (Rahandusministeerium). 
Although the Estonian civil service has been characterized as one 
of the least politicized in CEE (SIGMA 2009), during the eighth 
cabinet (1999–2002) to hold office after Estonia regained its re-
independence, only one out of twelve permanent secretaries was 
able to stay in office, and the tenth cabinet (2003–2005) changed 
one half of the permanent secretaries. Although the reasons for 
such replacements have ranged from politically motivated to 
practically justified, such turmoil in high public offices makes 
trust-building and serious commitment very difficult, especially 
considering the fact that top officials usually play a key role in 
developing performance indicators and leading the implementation 
of measurement systems. 
In addition to frequent turnover in political and 
administrative leadership, the legal environment in Estonia has 
also undergone rapid development. Therefore, definitions of 
indicators are subject to change as well. Consequently, the 
comparison of performance indicators between different 
measurement periods is very complicated and at times impossible 
(Riigikontroll 2008b). 
Previous studies on other CEE countries demonstrate that 
instability in the political and administrative arena as well as in the 
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legislative context is a typical phenomenon in the entire region. 
The average lifespan of government cabinets in Central and 
Eastern European countries is 1.4 years, compared to 1.9 in 
Western Europe (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 2001; Conrad and 
Golder 2010). Although there is fluctuation among the average 
figures for different CEE countries, it may still be concluded that 
cabinets in CEE are replaced more often than in the West. Several 
authors researching public management in CEE (e.g. Bouckaert et 
al. 2008; Dunn et al. 2008; Nakrošis 2008; Meyer-Sahling and 
Yesilkagit 2011; Randma-Liiv et al. 2011) point in their analyses 
to instability as one of the major factors differentiating Eastern 
Europe from Western democracies.  
Poor strategic planning and analytical skills: unsustainability 
of initiatives and deficient performance indicators 
The Estonian experience demonstrates how poor strategic planning 
and policy analysis may affect the outcome of performance 
measurement initiatives. Although necessary democratic 
institutions have been created in Estonia, politicians still have 
difficulties in setting strategic goals, which, in turn, engenders 
conflicting policies, symbolic objectives, frequently changing 
goals and unsustainable initiatives. As both politicians and civil 
servants only have two decades of experience in elaborating policy 
proposals, there is as yet no general culture which would require 
an ex ante analysis to precede the adoption of a new regulation or 
policy. In addition, since the entire society has grown accustomed 
to rapid and radical changes of the immediate past, it has been 
relatively easy for politicians, civil servants as well as citizens to 
accept new initiatives (including those related to performance 
measurement) without any major criticism. Moreover, when public 
organizations do not have a clear idea about the actual costs 
incurred in connection with performance measurement (such as 
the expenditure for designing the system; the productivity loss 
inherent in diverting the time and effort necessary to compile the 
assessment from other tasks; the expenditures required to update, 
develop, test, and keep inventories of the instrument(s) used for 
performance measurement, as well as the expenditure for keeping 
records of performance results and dealing with complaints – see 
Halachmi 1993), performance-oriented reforms are easy to be 
reversed when these costs must be borne. 
A key challenge faced by governments in new democracies 
is one of maintaining a strategic view in a rapidly changing 
political framework. However, the history of public administration 
in CEE tells us a mixed story of piecemeal attempts to reform 
existing systems (Verheijen 2003). Inconsistency of ideas, 
institutions and practices, deriving not only from political 
instability but also from deficient strategic planning and poor 
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analytical skills, have been highlighted by several studies (see e.g. 
Verheijen 2003; World Bank 2006; Bouckaert et al. 2008; Dunn et 
al. 2008; Nakrošis 2008; Nemec et al. 2008; SIGMA 2009; Meyer-
Sahling and Yesilkagit 2011; Randma-Liiv et al. 2011). 
Poor analytical capacity in CEE (see e.g. Verheijen 2003, 
World Bank 2006) is likely to lead to the development of 
inadequate performance indicators. On the one hand, limited 
analytical skills pose the risk of applying inappropriate 
measurement methods. On the other hand, performance 
measurement is not a valueless exercise. Several ‘democratic’ 
goals such as transparency, equal opportunities, access to public 
services, fair procedures and citizen participation in decision-
making may conflict with more ‘technocratic’ goals such as 
efficiency, effectiveness, value-for-money or fast decision-
making. Contradictions of this type are especially hard to solve in 
new democracies, where the principles informing the afore-
mentioned democratic goals are not as deeply held and broadly 
accepted as in countries with long democratic traditions. As a rule, 
‘technocratic’ goals are more easily quantifiable than ‘democratic’ 
goals. Decision-makers with relatively little (democratic) 
management experience and poor analytical capacities may easily 
gravitate down the slippery path of over-quantifying performance 
indicators because, as aptly summed up by Mintzberg (1994), 
these are easier to measure and look more objective, transparent 
and understandable than qualitative data. The situation will be 
even more complicated if limited resources bring pressure to 
prefer ‘technocratic’ goals. As a result, the concept of 
accountability to the general public with its multiple dimensions 
may easily change to single-track accountability for financial 
outcomes only. 
Implementation gap 
Political and administrative instability contributes to the fact that 
nation-wide initiatives of performance measurement are often met 
with implementation difficulties. Several reforms (e.g. the 
introduction of pay-for-performance in Estonia) have been 
discontinued half-way through and new initiatives can be started 
before previous steps in the field could even be evaluated (see also 
Verheijen 2003; Dunn et al. 2008; Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit 
2011 for broader CEE experience). Initiators of important reform 
plans rarely remain in office long enough to oversee their 
implementation and resolve any glitches in a manner coherent 
with the purposes of the reforms. 
Performance management is one of the most sophisticated 
areas of public management. Therefore, public sector managers in 
immature policy environments who often have insufficient 
managerial experience are likely to pay too little attention to its 
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conceptual and implementation problems. In addition, 
decentralization and a high degree of discretion – which usually go 
hand in hand with the introduction of performance management 
tools – may create opportunities for abuse by individual public 
organizations and their leaders. The introduction of performance 
measurement is susceptible not only to gaming with performance 
indicators and information but further to increasing politicization 
and to facilitating corruption – problems that are already pressing 
in new democracies (Nemec et al. 2008; SIGMA 2009). The 
implementation of performance measurement may also prove risky 
because of an insufficiently developed legislative framework and 
the general inadequacy of accountability and control mechanisms 
in CEE (World Bank 2006). 
The Estonian experience indicates that the ability of 
managers to make use of performance information is rather 
limited, largely because of insufficient management experience 
and weak links between strategic goals and evaluation. However, 
in terms of external use, performance information is even more 
neglected. In large part, the role and responsibility of the 
parliament have been limited to the preparation of large amounts 
of legislation required by post-communist transition and 
Europeanization due to the pressures of the immediate past. As a 
consequence, the parliament has proved unable to responsibly 
exercise its steering role of the executive, including setting 
performance targets and analyzing performance information. The 
lack of experience and analytical skills of MPs, coupled with the 
lack of resources and support staff, represent a serious handicap in 
terms of the scope and depth of parliamentary scrutiny. Additional 
problems specific to new democracies such as inadequate trust 
between politicians and civil servants (SIGMA 2009) are likely to 
compound the problem by turning the performance measurement 
process into an exercise of control. 
Foreign influence 
Why do new democracies keep experimenting with performance 
measurement tools although their contextual factors are not 
supportive for such endeavors? Besides a general fashion of 
performance measurement in the framework of NPM reforms, 
international organizations (primarily the IMF, the World Bank, 
and the OECD) have played a major role in the introduction of 
performance management tools in CEE. A number of such 
organizations have directly promoted and recommended 
performance management tools (see World Bank 2006; 
OECD/SIGMA 2007; OECD 2011, for example). Similarly to the 
senior public officials who have made a career out of 
‘modernizing’ and ‘streamlining’ activities (Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2004: 6), there are also many international consultants making a 
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living out of spreading ‘best practice’. The fact that the last few 
decades have resounded with ‘performance talk’ has paved the 
way for international consultants advocating performance 
management across the globe, including in CEE, despite the 
different context of post-communist countries. New democracies 
do not enjoy the history of democratic traditions and institutions, 
resulting, for instance, in a lack of administrative capacity and 
control mechanisms. Therefore, reform ideologies common to 
Western practices and advocated by Western public and private 
organizations may not be appropriate when applied to these 
countries (see also Schick 1998; Condrey et al. 2001; Randma-
Liiv 2007; Sobis and de Vries 2009). ‘One size fits all’ types of 
recommendations ignore the danger of policy failure caused by 
uninformed, incomplete or inappropriate policy transfer (Dolowitz 
and Marsh 2000). For new democracies, positive feedback from 
international evaluations is vital as it may determine the country’s 
acceptance in international organizations and its credibility for 
foreign partners. Such a predisposition creates an environment in 
which even general guidelines, ‘best practices’ and soft policy 
recommendations on the introduction of performance 
measurement tools can be taken very seriously by newly 
democratic states. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study confirms the results of previous research in that it 
highlights contradictory aspects of the concept of performance 
measurement and the challenges inherent in the corresponding 
implementation process. The analysis of the Estonian central 
government shows that many of the assumptions which have led to 
widespread public sector performance measurement as valid a 
priori turned out to stand on feet of clay. The Estonian 
governments of the last two decades have tried out most of the 
performance management tools known from Western experience. 
Many attempts have remained half-hearted or sporadic, yet 
performance measurement initiatives have become the subject of 
widespread and regular practice. The study at hand confirms 
Western experience; it shows that because of a variety of 
implementation difficulties and conceptual contradictions, 
management by targets and indicators does not guarantee better 
performance, or fulfillment of the managerial or democratic 
purposes of performance initiatives. 
The study demonstrates that although problems common to 
Western countries are also present in the Estonian context, they 
are compounded in the latter by specific contextual factors 
characteristic of new democracies. These include instability, poor 
analytical skills, implementation gap and foreign influence in 
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introducing performance measurement initiatives. These factors 
explain implementation difficulties of performance measurement 
and limited use of performance information in the context of post-
communist countries. 
The study has several implications for policy learning. 
Performance-orientation has been the centerpiece of the rhetoric of 
public management reforms in most new democracies in Europe 
due to the general appeal of NPM ideas and values during the last 
two decades. Although there are important differences among 
post-communist countries, their shared history of post-communist 
transition as well as Europeanization still appears to be taking 
them through a number of similar developments, offering them 
similar opportunities and exposing them to similar risks. The 
presence of ‘transitional’ factors analyzed in this paper (e.g. 
political and administrative instability, unsustainability of reforms, 
poor analytical skills in parliaments as well as in civil services, 
implementation gap, foreign influence) is likely to make the 
development of performance measurement in new democracies 
even more complicated than in the West. 
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